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Appropriation Without Benefit-Sharing: Origin-ofResource Disclosure Requirements and Enforcement
Under TRIPS and the Nagoya Protocol
Wallace Feng ∗

Abstract
Since the late twentieth century, there have been many instances of foreign entities
appropriating a country’s biological resources without sharing with that country the benefits of its
patents that are associated with those resources. This appropriation without benefit-sharing
(AWBS) has led to calls that patent applicants should disclose the geographical origins of
biological resources used in their inventions in order for patent offices to better assess the
patentability of these inventions. This Comment investigates whether international law mandates
disclosure and whether there can be an effective system to enforce disclosure by focusing on two
treaties: the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and
the Nagoya Protocol. The Comment argues that under TRIPS there are two situations that
likely trigger mandatory origin-of-resource disclosures and that under the Nagoya Protocol, patent
offices may effectively enforce the disclosure requirements to combat AWBS.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
The neem tree is a distinctive plant that is tied to the culture and history of
India. 1 Throughout the country’s history, the people of India have used extracts
of the neem tree for many practical purposes, ranging from cleaning teeth to
killing insects. 2 In 1959, Western countries were alerted to “the wonders [of the
neem tree] . . . when a German entomologist reported that neem trees were spared
during a locust swarm that devoured all other foliage.” 3
Around the late twentieth century, a U.S. chemicals corporation, W.R. Grace
(Grace) became interested in the neem tree. After experimenting on neem seeds
imported from India, 4 Grace isolated azadirachin, an active ingredient responsible
for the neem tree’s pesticide qualities. 5 In 1990, Grace filed a patent application
for a stabilized solution of azadirachtin in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO). 6 On its application, Grace failed to mention that the neem seeds on
which it experimented originated in India. 7 As patents generally provide the
patentee with a monopoly for a limited period of time, nondisclosure might have
delayed potential challenges to its patent. In 1992, the USPTO approved the
application. 8
Although Grace did not pursue a similar patent in India, 9 Grace’s U.S patent
had adverse economic effects on the South Asian country 10: “W.R. Grace began
processing twenty tons of neem seed per day. As a result, neem seed prices in
India skyrocketed from 300 rupees per ton to an average of 3500 rupees per
ton.” 11
Grace did not share the economic proceeds of its azadirachtin invention
with the people of India. 12 Many believed that Grace should have done so because
1

2

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

See Lorna Dwyer, Biopiracy, Trade, and Sustainable Development, 19 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
219, 226–27 (2008); Emily Marden, The Neem Tree Patent: International Conflict over the Commodification
of Life, 22 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 279, 283 (1999).
See Marden, supra note 1, at 283. See also David Conforto, Traditional and Modern-Day Biopiracy:
Redefining the Biopiracy Debate, 19 J. ENVT. L. & LITIG. 357, 390 (2004).
Marden, supra note 1, at 283.
See Grace Issues Statement About Patent for Neem Pesticide, PR NEWSWIRE (Sept. 14, 1995.).
See Marden, supra note 1, at 283.
See Dwyer, supra note 1, at 226–27; Marden, supra note 1, at 283–84.
See U.S. Patent No. 5,124,349 (issued June 23, 1992).
See id.
See Marden, supra note 1, at 283.
See Conforto, supra note 2, at 390.
Id.
See Marden, supra note 1, at 287.
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they believed that “Indians provided the raw material—an assiduously cultivated
understanding of the neem tree's properties—and that therefore they are the
rightful beneficiaries of any commercial development.” 13
The case of the neem tree is an example of a foreign entity appropriating
another country’s biological resources without sharing with that country the
benefits of its patents that are associated with those resources. Some
commentators have called this phenomenon patent-based biopiracy, which is
defined as “[t]he patenting of (often spurious) inventions based on biological
resources and/or traditional knowledge that are extracted without adequate
authorization and benefit sharing from other (usually developing countries),
indigenous or local communities.” 14 To avoid the negative connotation of the
word “biopiracy,” this Comment will call this phenomenon appropriation without
benefit sharing or AWBS for a more neutral connotation.
Since the late twentieth century, AWBS has become a common international
occurrence. 15 The rise of a lucrative biotechnology industry in countries such as
the U.S. has contributed to this phenomenon. 16 The strengthening of IP systems
in developed countries, including the U.S, and the expansion of IP protections to
biological materials and their derivatives may have also played a role in triggering
AWBS. 17 Increasingly, commentators and the international community have
argued that in AWBS cases, patent-holders should share the benefits and proceeds
of their inventions with the countries providing the biological resources. 18
However, benefit sharing cannot occur if patent-holders do not disclose the
geographical origins of the biological resources that they used for their inventions.
In fact, many cases of AWBS have persisted because of an information problem
that exists at the patent application stage. On their applications, those engaging in
AWBS often do not identify the geographical origins of biological materials. When
patent offices approve the applications, these patent-holders could enjoy the fruits
of their products for a long period without encountering a challenge. The case of
the neem tree fits here. As Grace did not state that its neem tree seeds originated

13
14

15
16
17
18

See id. at 287.
DANIEL F. ROBINSON, CONFRONTING BIOPIRACY: CHALLENGES, CASES,
DEBATES 21 (2010).
See id. at 46–76.

AND INTERNATIONAL

See Conforto, supra note 2, at 358.
See Dwyer, supra note 1, at 227.
See, for example, Paul Kuruk, Regulating Access to Traditional Knowledge and Genetic Resources: The Disclosure
Requirement as a Strategy to Combat Biopiracy, 17 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 1 (2015); Nuno Pires de
Carvalho, Requiring Disclosure of the Origin of Genetic Resources and Prior Informed Consent in Patent
Applications Without Infringing the TRIPS Agreement: The Problem and the Solution, 2 WASH U.J.L. & POL’Y
371, 374–75(2000); Marden, supra note 1, at 292–93.
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in India in its patent application, a challenge to its patent could not occur
immediately. 19 Only after three years was a challenge mounted. 20
At least two other possible instances of AWBS revolve around
nondisclosure: one involving the camu camu plant, between a Japanese cosmetics
company and Peru, 21 and another involving Ballia barley, between a Japanese beer
company and India. 22 There may be more examples of AWBS involving
nondisclosure that the international community has not identified yet.
Disclosure at the patent application stage is essential because it gives prompt
notice to those who want to challenge the patent. As inventions have to be
“novel” in order to be patentable, 23 disclosure could serve as a way for
governments and others to verify the patentability of products. 24 In fact,
“[m]andatory disclosure in biotechnological patent applications of any
geographical source and indigenous knowledge source would allow countries and
communities to review patent applications and file claims to block patents before
the grant.” 25 By having a voice in patentability, people of countries with high
biodiversity could have a property right in the invention, as international treaties
have recognized a country’s property right in its natural resources. 26
A disclosure requirement might also facilitate “fair and equitable benefitsharing.” 27 By enforcing such disclosure requirements, patent offices of various
nations could block applications of inventors who have not agreed to share the
economic and scientific benefits of their products with other countries. 28
Mandatory disclosure of the source of the biological materials on patent
19

20
21
22
23

24

See Marden, supra note 1, at 286 (showing a challenge occurred three years after the patent was
granted)
See id.
See Section VII, infra.
See Section VII, infra.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Part II, § 3, art. 27, ¶ 1, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
See generally Dwyer, supra note 1.

25

Maggie Kohls, Blackbeard or Albert Schweitzer: Reconciling Biopiracy, 6 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 108,
132 (2007).

26

See id.; Marden, supra note 1, at 281 (“Article 15 of the CBD [Convention on Biological Diveristy],
for example, recognizes a limited sovereign property right in genetic material found within a nation's
boundaries.”).
See Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Biodiversity, Tenth Meeting, Nagoya,
Jap., Oct. 18–29, 2010, Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable
Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Oct.
29, 2010, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/1 (Oct. 29., 2010) [hereinafter Nagoya
Protocol].

27

28

See id. at art. 17. For further discussion, see Sections VI and V, infra.
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applications would mean more accountability and make it less likely that
companies are able to patent biological inventions without first consulting with
the countries from which the biological resources were taken.
The purpose of this Comment is to investigate whether international law
mandates disclosure of the geographical origins of biological resources on patent
applications and whether such a disclosure requirement could be enforced. Two
important treaties that bind many countries and govern IP rights and the usage of
biological resources are the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) and the Nagoya Protocol of the Convention on
Biological Diversity (Nagoya Protocol). Commentators have argued that the
Nagoya Protocol does not require patent applicants to disclose the geographical
origins of their biological resources. 29 They have also asserted that TRIPS
mandates disclosure only when the “sources of those resources are unique,” but
they have not elaborated more on this issue. 30
Because some countries might not believe that TRIPS and/or the Nagoya
Protocol adequately protect their natural resources, they have advocated that the
WTO amend TRIPS to mandate disclosure in all circumstances. 31 Some nations
have taken the initiative to enact their own domestic laws requiring that patent
applicants disclose the geographical sources of any biological materials used in
their inventions. 32
In many cases, TRIPS and the Nagoya Protocol may be sufficient to solve
the AWBS problem without amendments to international law or the enactment
of sweeping national disclosure regulations. There are strong arguments that,
under TRIPS, patent applicants must disclose the origins of biological resources
on their applications in two circumstances: (1) when “the source of [a] biological
resource [is] unique” (under Article 29), 33 and (2) when a quality, characteristic, or
reputation of the biological resources that contributed to the development of an
invention is “essentially attributable” to a geographic region (under Article 22). 34
29

See Riccardo Pavoni, The Nagoya Protocol and WTO Law, in THE 2010 NAGOYA PROTOCOL ON ACCESS
AND BENEFIT-SHARING IN PERSPECTIVE 186, 201–204 (Elisa Morgera, Matthais Buck, & Elsa
Tsioumani, eds., 2013).

30

Carvalho, supra note 18, at 381. See also Committee on Trade and Environment, Report of the
Meeting Held on 24–25 of November 1997, WTO Doc. WT/CTE/M/16 at ¶ 90 (Dec. 19, 1997)
[hereinafter WT/CTE/M/16]
See Jacques de Werra, Fighting Against Biopiracy: Does the Obligation to Disclose in Patent Applications Truly
Help?, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 143, 145–49 (2009).
See generally Thomas Henninger, Disclosure Requirements in Patent Law and Related Measures: A
Comparative Overview of Existing National and Regional Legislation on Intellectual Property and Biodiversity, in
TRIGGERING THE SYNERGIES BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND BIODIVERSITY 293
(Alexander Werth and Susanne Reyes-Knoche eds., 2010), https://perma.cc/68LM-LNGU.
Carvalho, supra note 18, at 381.

31

32

33
34

See TRIPS, supra note 23, at art. 22.
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Pursuant to Article 17 of the Nagoya Protocol, a country could enact an effective
checkpoints system to enforce these minimum disclosure mandates. In fact, had
such a system existed––during the neem tree controversy and during the possible
AWBS cases involving camu camu and Ballia barley, these cases could have
resulted in the disclosure of the origins of the resources and the enactment of
benefit-sharing agreements among the providers and users of biological resources.
Section II of the Comment argues that international law should eliminate
AWBS. Section III describes the two important international treaties involving IP
and biological resources, TRIPS and the Nagoya Protocol. Section IV emphasizes
the importance of disclosure in combating AWBS. Section V shows that under
TRIPS, Article 29 and Article 22 likely require a patent applicant to indicate the
origins of their resources when two conditions are present. Section VI describes
a national checkpoints system under the Nagoya Protocol and shows how this
system would operate as a mechanism to enforce the required disclosures of
TRIPS. Finally, Section VII will demonstrate how this new regime could be
applied to the neem tree controversy and the possible AWBS cases of camu camu
and Ballia barley.

II. T HE C ASE A GAINST AWBS
AWBS has its advocates and its critics. Supporters of AWBS have argued
that AWBS should be allowed to continue because it contributes to medical and
scientific innovation. 35 These advocates underscore the value of AWBS in
facilitating the development of medicine, as AWBS can make previously obscure
natural resources available for scientific study, which can lead to new cures for
diseases. 36 Supporters of AWBS have also asserted that if inventors must
compensate the country in which the raw resources were found, then
“[p]harmaceutical companies, agribusiness and bio-tech firms would be forced to
buy information and germplasm from rights holders and might well encounter
refusals to deal.” 37
On the other hand, it is impossible to ignore the fact that AWBS has
significant negative externalities. 38 For one, AWBS can result in economic harms. 39
By patenting biological resources or drugs derived from them, companies may
prevent those in countries where the resources were found from selling these
35
36

37

See Paul J. Heald, The Rhetoric of Biopiracy, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 519 (2003).
See id. at 531 (Explaining that as “four-fifths of all drugs have their basis in natural plant
resources . . . a cure for cancer may well be found in the rain forest.”).
Id. at 531–32.

38

See, for example, Conforto, supra note 2, at 390; Dwyer, supra note 1, at 228–29; ROBINSON, supra note
14, at 102–05.

39

See Dwyer, supra note 1, at 228–29; ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 102–05.
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resources. 40 For example, in the late 1990s, an American company that acquired a
patent on yellow Mexican beans stopped trade of yellow beans between the U.S.
and Mexico. 41 Similarly, in the pharmaceuticals industry, a company with a patent
on drugs derived from a biological resource may also compete in the market of
the country where the material is found. 42 Since IP systems create strong market
protections for those with patent rights, those committing AWBS can take
advantage of those rights to maximize their economic welfare to the detriment of
others.
AWBS can have also adverse social and environmental effects. 43 People
often feel slighted when a corporation of a foreign country patents products based
on their natural resources without obtaining express permission from their local
government because they have emotional attachments to certain raw resource. 44
This slight can breed mistrust between locals and future researchers, which can
then lead to less collaboration between that nation and scientists of another
country. 45 In cases where the level of collaboration has not decreased, AWBS can
lead to overexploitation of a biological resource, which may lead to eventual loss
of that material in the environment. As shown in some African countries,
overharvesting of the hoodia plant for the isolation of a biochemical has led to
the “destruction and fragmentation of the hoodia populations.” 46 Thus, despite
some positive effects, AWBS causes significant problems that the international
community needs to address.

III. T HE R ELEVANT L AW : TRIPS AND THE
N AGOYA P ROTOCOL
There are two important treaties regarding IP and the access and use of
biological materials: TRIPS and the Nagoya Protocol of the Conservation of
Biological Diversity. This Section will discuss both of these conventions in regards
to how they relate the AWBS.

40
41

See Dwyer, supra note 1, at 364–65; Robinson, supra note 14, at 103.
See ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 103.

42

See id. at 105 (“This has occurred in cases such as the plao noi example, whereby a trademarked and
patented Japanese product has been developed from Thai traditional knowledge and sold back to
the Thai market in direct competition with herbal remedies that use plao noi as a peptic ulcer
treatment.”).

43

See id. at 108–14.
See id. at 109 (“Culture affront is usually felt in circumstances whereby prior informed consent has
not been sought of local or indigenous ‘provider groups’ groups.”).
See id. at 113–14.

44

45
46

Id. at 113.
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A. TRIPS
In 1994, “multilateral trade negotiations . . . culminated in the signing of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.” 47 TRIPS accompanied
the emergence of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 48 Parties to TRIPS
agreed that TRIPS was necessary due to “three fundamental reasons: the
increasing economic significance [of intellectual property rights] and hence the
need for protection of the property protected by these rights, the deficits in
traditional international protection of these rights, and the questionable nature of
unilateral and bilateral protection.” 49
In the late twentieth century, IP rights became an increasingly important
economic issue. 50 Piracy emerged as a global concern. 51 Prior to TRIPS, countries
had a hard time dealing with piracy because there was “no universal application
of traditional international conventions and agreements,” 52 and there were few
incentives for countries to “accede to and develop traditional international
conventions and agreements” 53 regarding IP protections.
Still, there was an international need to harmonize the IP systems of various
countries and to combat piracy. 54 TRIPS was able to fulfill these needs. By linking
“intellectual property rights to international free trade,” TRIPS was able to obtain
the signatures and ratification of both developed and developing nations. 55 As of
this date, there are 164 contracting parties to TRIPS, including the U.S., Japan,
and the E.U., which have very strong IP protection systems. 56

47

Paul Katzenberger & Annette Kur, TRIPs and Intellectual Property, in FROM GATT TO TRIPS—THE
AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, 1, (FriedrichKarl Beier & Gerhard Schricker, eds., 1996).

48

Id. at 2.
Id. at 8.

49
50

See id. at 9 (“Research and development investments made in industrialized states and technology
exports to developing and threshold countries” contributed to a nation’s economic welfare).

51

See Katzenberger & Kur, supra note 47, at 8 (“[T]rademark and product piracy not only in
industrialized countries but also in developing . . . countries, including exportation of counterfeit
goods caus[es] losses in billions to industrialized states.”).
Id. at 10.

52
53
54
55
56

Id. at 11.
See id. at 3–5.
Id. at 14.
See Other IP Treaties, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, https://perma.cc/6VEV4XUC (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).

Summer 2017

253

Chicago Journal of International Law

TRIPS called for the contracting nations to enact minimum standards of IP
protections in their own domestic laws. 57 What constitutes minimum standards is
detailed within TRIPS. Of course, nations have the discretion to establish higher
standards of protection through their domestic legislation. TRIPS deals with all
areas of IP law including patents, copyright, trademarks, and geographical
indications. 58 In combating AWBS, the standards regarding patent and
geographical indications are applicable.

1. TRIPS provides the minimum standards for patents.
Articles 27 to 34 of TRIPS relate to patents. 59 Article 27 governs the
standards for patentability, which originates from American IP law. 60 Products
and processes are patentable if they are “new, involve an inventive step and are
capable of industrial application.” 61 What it means to be “new,” “inventive,” and
“capable of industrial application” is left up to the discretion of individual
nations. 62
Under Article 27, nations could exempt certain items from patentability. 63
Such products include biological resources. 64 However, many nations including
the U.S. hold that biological materials are patentable. 65
Inventors who want to patent their products or processes in a country must
submit an application to the patent offices of that country. In the application, the
inventors must disclose the invention “in a manner sufficiently clear and complete
for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art.” 66 There are also
two optional conditions for further disclosures. 67 First, parties to TRIPS have the
discretion to require that the patent applicant “indicate the best mode for carrying
57

See Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, https://perma.cc/9EZ6PSVH. (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).

58

See generally TRIPS, supra note 23.
Joseph Straus, Implications of the TRIPs Agreement in the Field of Patent Law, in FROM GATT TO TRIPSTHE AGREEMENT ON TRADE ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 160, 179 (FriedrichKarl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1996).

59

60
61
62
63
64
65

66
67

See id. at 196.
See TRIPS, supra note 23, at art. 27.
See Straus, supra note 59, at 196.
See id. at 183.
See TRIPS, supra note 23, at art. 27.
See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); Dwyer, supra note 1, at 224; Council Directive
98/44/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the Legal Protection
of Biotechnological Inventions, 1998 O.J. (L 213/13); Examination Handbook for Patent and
Utility Model, Japan Patent Office, Chs. 2–3, https://perma.cc/DQN6-VWDP.
See TRIPS, supra note 23, at art. 29.
See id. at art. 27
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out the invention known to the inventor.” 68 Second, a nation could require that
the applicant “provide information concerning the applicant's corresponding
foreign applications and grants.” 69
Under TRIPS, patent-holders generally have the sole right to exclude others
from creating and selling their inventions. 70 In some instances, these patentholders may license their inventions to others. 71

2. TRIPS provides the minimum standards for geographical
indications.
The provisions of TRIPS governing geographical indications are covered in
Articles 22 to 24. 72 Article 22(1) defines geographical indications as “indications
which identify a good as originating in the territory of a Member, or a region or
locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic
of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin.” 73 Article 22
applies to all goods. 74 These indications “confer to all producers from a given
geographical area the exclusive right to use a distinctive sign to identify their
products if they possess a given quality, reputation, or other characteristic
attributable to their geographical origins.” 75
TRIPS does not define the legal principles surrounding the “necessary link
between good and geographical origin.” 76 This Comment addresses the meaning
of this phrase more in depth in Section V.
Article 22(2) requires states to “protect against any use of designations or
presentations of goods that misleads the public as to the geographical origin
thereof.” 77 There are additional levels of protections of geographical indications
for wines and spirits. 78 However, in the eyes of one commentator, “[t]he weak
68
69
70
71
72

73

Id.
Id.
See TRIPS, supra note 23, at art. 28.
Id.
See Roland Knaak, The Protection of Geographical Indications According to the TRIPs Agreement, in FROM
GATT TO TRIPS – THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
117, 127 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker, eds., 1996)).
TRIPS, supra note 23, at art. 22.

74

See Knaak, supra note 72, at 128 (“These words . . . make clear that the provisions of the TRIPs
Agreement cover geographical indications for all goods, including industrial products”).

75

José Manuel Cortés Martín, TRIPS Agreement: Towards a Better Protection for Geographical Indications?, 30
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 117, 117 (2004).

76

Knaak, supra note 72, at 128.
TRIPS, supra note 23, at art. 22.

77
78

See id.

Summer 2017

255

Chicago Journal of International Law

point of the protection of geographical indications under Art. 22(2) of the TRIPS
Agreement is that this protection is subject to the principle of the country of
protection.” 79 “This means that . . . it is the courts or authorities of the protecting
country that decide on the basis of conditions or opinions of the relevant public
prevailing there whether the use of a geographical indication is likely to cause
deception or confusion.” 80

B. The
Nagoya
Protocol
Biological Diversity

of

the

Convention

on

The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 81 was enacted in response to
the rapid growth of modern medicine. 82 Entered into force in 1992, 83 the CBD is
dedicated to ensuring that access and benefits-sharing (ABS) and prior informed
consent are obtained between the user and provider of the biological resources. 84
In fact, one of the goals of the CBD is to guarantee “the fair and equitable
sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources.” 85
Recognizing that states have ownership over their biological resources, 86 the CBD
“envisages the establishment of a relationship between the State and the local or
indigenous community whose traditional knowledge is utilized for the
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.” 87
The CBD had many deficiencies that prevented countries from reaching
compliance. For one, “[f]ew CBD Parties have had the legal capacity to translate
the CBD provisions” into their domestic law. 88 Second, the provisions pertaining
to ABS are worded too generally. 89 Countries with strong pharmaceutical

79

Knaak, supra note 72, at 130.

80

Id. at 130–31.
See Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S 79; 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992)
[hereinafter CBD].
See Elisa Morgera, Matthias Buck, & Elsa Tsioumani, Introduction, in THE 2010 NAGOYA PROTOCOL
ON ACCESS AND BENEFIT-SHARING IN PERSPECTIVE 1, 3 (Elisa Morgera, Matthais Buck, Elsa
Tsioumani, eds., 2013) (stating that modern medical science “ha[s] led to the rapid growth of
scientific research on the genetic base of life [and] on the relevance of genes for the biological and
chemical make up of cells and organisms”).

81

82

83
84
85
86
87
88
89

See id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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industries did not want to share profits. 90 Currently, there are 196 nations that are
parties to the CBD. 91 The U.S. has signed but not ratified the CBD. 92
The Nagoya Protocol was entered into force in 2014 to address some of
these deficiencies. 93 It “set[s] out rules and procedures on access, benefit-sharing,
and compliance” in regards to the use of genetic resources. 94 The Nagoya Protocol
defines genetic resources broadly to include biological resources 95 and “spells out
the basic conditions for ABS, including key elements of national measures in
provider and user countries related to access, benefit-sharing, institutional
responsibilities, and compliance.” 96 This international instrument also addresses
the “need to ensure the protection of traditional knowledge and to support
[indigenous] communities’ customary laws and procedures.” 97
Reaffirming that states have sovereignty over their natural resources, 98 the
Nagoya Protocol requires that the user of biological resources obtain “prior
informed consent of the Party providing such resources that is the country of
origin of such resources or a Party that has acquired the genetic resources in
accordance with the Convention.” 99 In essence, the Nagoya Protocol recognizes
that in many instances of AWBS, the country providing the natural resources is
also the geographical origin of those resources.
Once a user receives consent from the provider country, the Nagoya
Protocol mandates that the user party and the provider party initiate a fair and
equitable benefits-sharing agreement: “benefits arising from the utilization of
genetic resources as well as subsequent applications and commercialization shall
be shared in a fair and equitable way with the Party providing such resources that
is the country of origin of such resources or a Party that has acquired the genetic
resources in accordance with the Convention. Such sharing shall be upon mutually

90
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See id. at 4–5.
See List of Parties, CONVENTION
visited Mar. 31, 2017).
See id.
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agreed terms.” 100 Though the Nagoya Protocol never defines what is “fair and
equitable,” 101 it lists certain types of compensation that could constitute a shared
benefit. 102
The Nagoya Protocol necessitates that party states establish “an Access and
Benefit-Sharing Clearing-House.” 103 This clearing-house is a “platform” 104 that
will “serve as a means for sharing of information related to access and benefitsharing” and “provide access to information made available by each Party relevant
to the implementation of this Protocol.” 105 Such information includes
“[l]egislative, administrative and policy measures on access and benefit-sharing
. . . [and] [i]nformation on the national focal point and competent national
authority or authorities.” 106
To ensure compliance with the provisions of this treaty, the Nagoya
Protocol mandates that states create checkpoints. 107 “[C]heckpoints . . . have to be
effective and have functions relevant to the monitoring of the utilisation of genetic
resources or the gathering of relevant information at any stage of research,
development, innovation and pre-commercialisation.” 108 The Nagoya Protocol
does not define what types of institutions could serve as checkpoints. 109 Neither
does it give any types of attributes or properties that checkpoints should have. 110
Rather, it is the decision of the provider and the user state to designate
checkpoints. 111 “Such flexibility is provided so that the checkpoints most suited
to national circumstances can be selected. Thus, parties have the flexibility to
decide on whether to designate the patent office as a checkpoint.” 112
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Id. at art. 5.
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See generally id.
See id. at annex.
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See id. at art. 15.
The ABS Clearing-House, CONVENTION ON BIODIVERSITY, https://perma.cc/5GNB-Q4H6. (last
visited Mar. 31, 2017).
Nagoya Protocol, supra note 27, at art. 14.
Id. at art. 14.
Id. at art. 17.
Abdul Haseeb Ansari & Lekha Laxman, A Review of the International Framework for Access and Benefit
Sharing of Genetic Resources with Special Reference to the Nagoya Protocol, 16 ASIA PAC. J. ENVT’L L. 105,
131 (2013).
See generally Nagoya Protocol, supra note 27; see also Ansari & Laxman, supra note 108, at 131.
See generally Nagoya Protocol, supra note 27; see also Ansari & Laxman, supra note 108, at 131.
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As of the date, there are eighty-six parties to the Protocol including countries
with strong IP systems such as the E.U. and Japan. 113 The U.S. has neither ratified
nor signed the Protocol. 114

IV. D ISC LOSURE I S I MPORTANT IN C OMBATING AWBS
Many nations have recognized the importance of disclosure in the patent
application process and in combating AWBS. 115 One of the reasons that disclosure
is significant is that it creates transparency in the patent application process. 116 By
doing so, an origin-of-resource disclosure can give notice to those who want to
challenge the patentability of the invention. For instance, had Grace’s researchers
disclosed in their patent application for azadirachin that they used neem seeds
from India, a challenge to Grace could have occurred immediately after the
application filing.
In fact, origin-of-resource disclosures could stop a product from becoming
patented in the first place. According to Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, India,
and Pakistan, which submitted a joint document to the TRIPS Council, disclosure
might “prevent the grant of bad patents and promote greater legal certainty.” 117
Disclosure “would ensure that the patent system does not issue bad patents” and
would lead to fewer instances of patent revocations, which could place a costly
burden on a patent office. 118
Disclosure could also help “build databases to aid in ‘the prior art
information available to patent examiners and the general public.’” 119 These
databases could potentially link different biological materials with their
geographical origins and add to the expanding knowledge of the natural world
that patent examiners may need to evaluate an invention.
Moreover, requiring disclosure can serve as a way for patent offices to keep
track of any benefit-sharing agreement enacted between the country providing the
113

See Parties to the Nagoya Protocol, CONVENTION
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biological resource and the entity that wants to access the resource. 120 If countries
find a way to enforce the disclosure requirement by conditioning disclosure on
patentability, they could also enforce the benefit-sharing requirement of the
Nagoya Protocol as well. 121
However, some critics have argued that disclosure requirements are not
worthwhile because they do not actually lead to benefit-sharing. These
commentators have further asserted that sanctions against patent applicants who
fail to disclose are not effective in encouraging transparency in the application
process. 122 Even the strongest sanctions, such as the denial of the patent, may not
lead to benefit-sharing. 123
Implicit in these contentions may be the fact that currently, different
countries have different rules on origin-of-resource disclosure and varying levels
of enforcement. 124 If one country has fewer rules of disclosure or is more lenient
on the enforcement of disclosure than another country, then a patent applicant
could choose to file an application in the second country.
Nevertheless, as we will see in this Comment, one could argue that TRIPS
provides a minimum standard of disclosure for all countries that are parties to the
treaty and if these countries have a system enforcing this minimum standard,
disclosure could likely lead to more transparency in the patent application process
and more benefit-sharing.

V. TRIPS L IKELY M ANDATES D ISC LOSURE OF B IOLOGICAL
R ESOURCES ON P ATENT A PPLICATIONS U NDER A RTICLES
22 AND 29
There are strong arguments that under TRIPS, two circumstances trigger
mandatory origin-of-resource disclosure on patent applications. First, when “the
sources of the biological resources [that form the basis of an invention] are
unique,” Article 29 of TRIPS likely requires disclosure. 125 Second, when “a quality,
characteristic, or reputation” of a biological material that contributed to the
development of an invention is “essentially attributed” to a geographic region,
Article 22 of TRIPS likely requires that a patent applicant indicate the geographic
source of the biological element. 126
120
121
122
123
124
125
126

See de Werra, supra note 31, at 154.
See id. at §§ VI and VII, infra.
See id. at 155–56.
See id. at 156–57.
See Henninger, supra note 32.
WT/CTE/M/16, supra note 30, at ¶ 90.
TRIPS, supra note 23, at art. 22.
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A. Article 29 of TRIPS
Commentators have asserted that Article 29 of TRIPS requires disclosure
when “the source of the biological resource [is] unique.” 127 However, they have
not explained the implications of this statement. 128 In this section, I will illustrate
the meaning of the phrase “the source of the biological resource [is] unique” and
demonstrate how the uniqueness of the “source” triggers disclosure under Article
29. 129

1. There are two possible interpretations of the phrase, “source of the
biological resource [is] unique.”
One can reasonably interpret the phrase “the source of the biological
resource [is] unique” in two ways. 130 On one hand, one can assert that the word
“source” refers to the area or country where a biological material is found. When
that location has rare physical and environmental characteristics, then the
geographical “source” of the biological material is “unique.” 131
On the other hand, one can argue that the phrase “the source of the
biological resource [is] unique” refers to the nature of the biological material
itself. 132 If an inventor uses a biological material with exceptional features, then
one can characterize that material as “unique.” 133

2. Article 29 requires disclosure when either the geographical location
is unique or the biological resource is unique because such
disclosure is necessary to describe an invention clearly.
Article 29 of TRIPS states that “[m]embers shall require that an applicant
for a patent shall disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete
for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art.” 134 If the biological
materials that form the basis of an invention are unique, Article 29 mandates
disclosure. Similarly, if the geographical homes of those materials are unique,
Article 29 requires disclosure.
The rationales behind these assertions are as follows: when a biological
material cannot be found anywhere except in one area of a country, failure to
127

WT/CTE/M/16, supra note 30, at ¶ 90.

128

See id.; Carvalho, supra note 19, at 391.
Carvalho, supra note 19, at 391.
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disclose the source of that material would make it extremely difficult, if not
impossible, for another inventor to find it to recreate the invention. This failure
would mean that the invention is not described “sufficiently clearly and
completely.” 135
An example can illustrate the rationales more fully. Let us assume that a plant
found in a remote part of the world contains a biochemical that is not located
anywhere else in the world. The plant and the biochemical are unique. The
location where the plant is found may also be unique because nowhere else can
one find that plant. An inventor creates an antiviral drug based on the chemical
found in the plant. If the inventor files a patent application without disclosing the
source of the chemical, then a “person skilled in the art” may not know where to
obtain such a resource in order to recreate the final product. 136 This implication
contravenes Article 29’s need for a patent description to be “sufficiently clear and
complete.” 137 As a result, if the biological elements that constitute the building
blocks of an invention are distinct or if the geographical origin of these building
blocks are unique, then under TRIPS, it becomes necessary for the patent
applicant to reveal the geographic origin of the resource.

3. This interpretation of Article 29 has support from U.S. patent law.
U.S. patent law provides further support that Article 29 of TRIPS mandates
disclosure when the “source of the biological resource [is] unique.” 138 Article 29,
which states that patent applicants must “disclose the invention in a manner
sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be carried out by a person
skilled in the art,” 139 is analogous to Section 112 of the U.S. Patent Act, which
holds that the patent application “shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which
it pertains or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same,
and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his
invention.” 140 The provision of the Patent Act requiring that the patent application
contain sufficient information to “enable any person in the skilled in the art . . . to
make and use” the invention is the enablement clause. 141

135
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138
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140
141
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Id.
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WT/CTE/M/16, supra note 30, at ¶ 90.
TRIPS, supra note 23, at art. 29.
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Because of the similarity between the wording in Article 29 and the wording
in the enablement clause of Section 112, the enablement clause in U.S. patent law
likely provides guidance to the proper interpretation of Article 29. In the U.S.,
“patents are written to enable those skilled in the art to practice the invention.” 142
The Federal Circuit, in the seminal case In Re Wands, held that the information
disclosed in a patent application must teach an ordinary person with the relevant
scientific or engineering expertise to recreate the invention without undue
experimentation. 143 If methods or products used in the creation of the invention
are not well known, then the patent applicant must disclose them in his or her
application. 144 Failure to reveal such information implies that recreation would
cause “undue experimentation.” 145
U.S. patent law, therefore, suggests that that if a biological material is unique
or is found in a unique area of the world, then the patent applicant needs to
disclose its location. After all, when a resource is one-of-a-kind, its geographical
home is unlikely to be well-known to an ordinary person, even if that person has
the right scientific skills. In this situation, a patent applicant must tell the reader
where to obtain the material. Hiding information about the resource’s
geographical location would contravene the “undue experimentation” principle of
the U.S.’s enablement clause. 146 Since Article 29 of TRIPS is the international
analogue to Section 112, Article 29 also requires disclosure when “the source of
biological resource [is] unique.” 147

B. Article 22
In many instances of AWBS, inventors often utilize biological resources
whose “qualit[ies], reputation, or other characteristic[s]” are connected to, or
“essentially attributable to” the regions in which they are found. 148 Examples of
such resources may include the neem tree of India, camu camu of Peru, and Ballia
barley of India. 149 When the biological resources that constitute the building
blocks of an invention are “essentially attributable” to their geographic origins,
then a possible argument exists that under Article 22 of TRIPS, an inventor must
142

In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc.,
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This Comment will explain these examples in depth in Section VII, infra.

Summer 2017

263

Chicago Journal of International Law

disclose the origins of resources on a patent application. The inventor can do this
by using appropriate geographical indications. However, there is a limitation of
Article 22 in mandating disclosure: if the biological and/or chemical materials that
form the basis for an invention are synthesized in a lab, then Article 22 does not
require that the patent applicant disclose the origins of those materials.

1. What are geographical indications?
Article 22 defines geographical indications as words, signs, or symbols that
“identify a good as originating in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality
in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the
good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin.” 150 In layman terms,
geographical indications are “names of places, regions, localities, and other
identifying characteristics of that type” that tie the good to the specific country or
region within the country of its origin. 151 Most commonly, a geographical
indication consists of the name of the place of origin of the good, such as “Jamaica
Blue Mountain” or “Darjeeling.” 152 “But non-geographical names, such as ‘Vinho
Verde,’ ‘Cava’ or ‘Argan Oil,’ or symbols commonly associated with a country,
can also constitute” a geographical indication. 153
Because “[t]he TRIPS Agreement does not contain product-specific limits
to the scope of application of the provisions on geographical indications, any
product, even inventions specified on patent applications, qualify as ‘goods’ within
the scope of Article 22.” 154

2. What does the phrase “essentially attributable” mean under
Article 22?
In order for a geographical indication to be valid under Article 22, it must
link the good to its country of origin where a characteristic or reputation of the
good is “essentially attributed” to that location. 155 In TRIPS, “no test is offered to
determine what it means to be ‘essentially attributed.’” 156 By not incorporating a

150
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specific test, TRIPS leaves it to the discretion of member states to determine what
kinds of goods are protected. 157
We may be able to determine an implicit definition based on common uses
of the geographical indications, as, traditionally, geographical indications are
attached to products where a quality or reputation of that product is closely tied
to that region. Geographical indications “reward goodwill and reputation created
or built up by a group of producers over many years and, in this sense, operate to
maintain traditional knowledge and practices." 158 One example of a geographical
indication is the word “Champagne,” which is attached to the “prestigious
sparkling wine” made from the French region of Champagne. 159 Another example
is the words “Parmigiano Reggiano,” which is connected to the “famous cheese
from Parma in Italy.” 160 These historical uses of geographical indications suggest
that geographic indications attach to goods with distinctive qualities “that cannot
be replicated elsewhere.” 161 This statement implies that environment contributed
to the production of the good and that the labors of the citizens of that country
helped contribute to the distinctive qualities or the unique reputation of the
product. Thus, in the eyes of one commentator, “essentially attributable” means
that “the territory and the characteristics of the product have to be linked by a
causal relationship.” 162

3. Article 22 likely requires origin-of-resource disclosures on patent
applications in certain cases.
When an inventor creates a product from a biological resource that has “a
given quality, reputation or other characteristic [that] is essentially attributable” to
a nation or region, and the invention takes advantage of the distinctive quality of
the resource for its efficacy, Article 22 likely mandates that the inventor reveal the
geographical origin of the biological material on a patent application because
failure to do so would “mislead[] the public as to the geographical origin of the
good.” 163 The inventor can satisfy this requirement by using the proper
157
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TRIPS, supra note 23, at art. 22 (stating that “[i]n respect of geographical indications, [m]embers
shall provide the legal means for interested parties to prevent . . . the use of any means in the
designation or presentation of a good that indicates or suggests that the good in question originates
in a geographical area other than the true place of origin in a manner which misleads the public as
to the geographical origin of the good”).
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geographical indications in his or her patent application. 164 The inventor cannot
remain silent as to the origin of the resource. The requirement to disclose may be
evident through an examination of: (1) how geographical indications would attach
to biological inventions, and (2) how the absence of geographical indications on
patent applications would mislead the public as to the origins of the invention.
a) How do geographical indications attach to inventions based on
biological resources?
Suppose that an invention such as a new drug is made with a biological
resource that has a quality or reputation “essentially attributable to its geographical
origin.” 165 This biological resource is not synthesized in a lab; rather, it is taken
from its country of origin. The invention utilizes a quality of the biological
resource for its efficacy. Under Article 22, a geographic indication should attach
to the invention, connecting the invention to the country or region where the
biological resource was found.
The rationale behind this assertion is that the invention is inherently linked
to its building block and to geographic origin of the resource. Because the
biological resource forms the basis for the patent, the biological material is
necessary to the invention. As the invention takes advantage of a distinctive
characteristic of the resource for its efficacy, the invention is also essentially linked
to region or country where the resource is found. After all, the atmosphere, soil,
and other physical conditions provided by that region or country were necessary
to produce the distinctive qualities of that biological material. If people in the area
had to cultivate the growth of the biological resource (such as a plant), then their
cultivation methods might have contributed to the distinctiveness of the material.
The labor of those individuals as well as the physical environment might have also
contributed to any reputation that the biological resources enjoy in a regional or
world market. Therefore, though the invention may be created and manufactured
in another country, the invention’s actual origin and efficacy are essentially tied to
the geographical home of its biological building block, and a geographic indication
linking the invention to the member state should be attached to the invention.
An illustration would clarify these principles. Let us assume that recently,
researchers have found that a specific species of tea plant grown in a country has
higher antioxidant levels than many other tea plants. The plant’s high antioxidant
levels are due to the soil and climate of its home country as well as the work of
the farmers who grew the plant. Tea from this country may have a reputation of
preventing cancer due to the high antioxidant concentration. As a result, the
quality and the reputation of the tea plant is “essentially attributable” to its
geographic origin. An inventor from another country then takes the plant and
164
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creates an antioxidant drug to fight cancer. Because the drug utilizes the
distinctively high antioxidant qualities of the plant, the effectiveness of the drug is
essentially tied to the plant and to the plant’s native territory. Similarly, the
existence of the drug itself is owed to the plant and to the plant’s native territory.
Thus, the geographic origin of the drug is the same as the geographic origin of the
plant. A geographic indication is needed to link the drug to that country or a region
within that country.
b) How does nondisclosure of the origins of the biological resources on a patent
application mislead the public on the origin of the invention when the invention
is “essentially attributable” to the geographical source of the biological resource?
Article 22 requires that “[i]n respect of geographical indications, [m]embers
shall provide the legal means for interested parties to prevent . . . the use of any
means in the designation or presentation of a good that indicates or suggests that
the good in question originates in a geographical area other than the true place of
origin in a manner which misleads the public as to the geographical origin of the
good.” 166 For patent applicants that utilize biological resources for their
inventions, there is a strong argument that they must disclose the geographic
origins of their biological resources through geographical indications when the
resource has a quality or reputation “essentially attributable to its geographic
origin.” 167 Silence may not be an option.
Patent applications are public documents, as they are submitted to patent
offices (which are public agencies) and then released to the public within a certain
period of time. In the U.S., patent applications are submitted to the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and the application is released to the
public within 18 months of filing. 168 Similarly, in the E.U., inventors file patent
application with the European Patent Office and applications are released to the
public within 18 months of filing. 169 Thus, if an inventor misrepresents
information on a patent application, the inventor is misleading the public.
When an invention based on a biological material is “essentially attributable”
to the geographical origin of that material, 170 failure to disclose the geographical
source of a biological material on a patent application can likely mislead the public
on the origins of the patented product. 171 Silence can constitute deception in many
areas of law. For instance, in the U.S., the FTC prohibits omissions of disclosure
166

Id. at art. 22.

167
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when such omissions occur “in the context of a half truth or occur under
circumstances where silence constitutes an implied misrepresentation.” 172
Similarly, the U.S. International Trade Commission has found that omitting
designation of the country of origin for imported caulking guns constitutes
misrepresentation. 173
Patent applicants who omit the sources of biological materials likely commit
an act of misrepresentation for two reasons. First, if the applicant does not
mention the geographical origins of biological materials that are “essentially
attributable” to a foreign country, patent examiners, who represent the public, and
other members of the public who read the application may believe that the
invention was created domestically without raw resources from other countries.
Because some inventors would reveal the sources of foreign materials in their
patent applications, 174 readers are more likely to believe that those who do not
disclose are not using such materials. Under consumer protection laws of many
nations such as the U.S. and much of the Continental Europe, the fact that a
reasonable or average person would be deceived from silence constitutes
misrepresentation. 175 As such, anyone reading patent applications including patent
examiners could become mistaken to the actual geographic origin of the invention.
Second, silence as to the actual origin of the invention and the biological
resources can constitute a material deception. We can draw a similarity between
the legal principles governing geographical indications and the legal principles
governing consumer protection because both deal with the presentation of
information about products to the public. In the consumer protection laws of
countries like the U.S., facts are material if they can influence consumer choice. 176
Analogously, information pertaining to the origin is material not only because it
may influence consumers who purchase the product (as some consumers may
want to learn about the origins of products before buying), but also because it
identifies to the patent office (which is representative of the public) another
country or region that may have an interest in the invention. Omission of this
pertinent information would mislead the patent office or members of the public
into believing that only the applicant has a right to the invention. Because Article
22 prevents misleading acts, the failure to disclose the origin of the biological
resource that constitutes the basis for an invention contravenes Article 22.

172
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See Ross D. Petty, Advertising Law and Social Issues: The Global Perspective, 17 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.
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Therefore, when the biological materials and the invention based on those
materials are “essentially attributable” to a geographical location, one can contend
that Article 22 likely requires the revelation of that location on a patent
application. 177 The patent applicant can satisfy this disclosure requirement by
attaching a geographical indication to the invention or to the biological resources
that form the basis of his or her invention.

4. There are strong counterarguments that Article 22 is not intended
to apply to information on patent applications.
Nevertheless, there are compelling counterarguments that Article 22 is not
meant to require disclosure on patent applications. Article 22 focuses on acts that
“mislead[] the public as to the geographical origin of a good.” 178 As geographical
indications are traditionally placed on the packaging of products for the viewing
of consumers, 179 one can assert that the word “public” in Article 22 refers only to
consumers and does not encompass representatives of the public such as patent
examiners. 180 Because most consumers do not read patent applications for
disclosures of new inventions, it is possible that the drafters of TRIPS only
intended Article 22 to apply to labels on product packaging.
Second, one could contend that omissions of geographical indications do
not warrant TRIPS protection because, generally, omissions are not deceptive.
The fact that Article 23 of TRIPS gives heightened requirements for protections
of geographical indications for wines and spirits might suggest that for nonalcoholic goods, omissions of geographical origins might not be deceptive enough
for TRIPS to remedy, or that for these products TRIPS only protects against
affirmative acts of deception. 181
As convincing as these arguments are, they may not be entirely conclusive.
For instance, had the drafters intended Article 22 to apply solely to consumers,
the drafters would have likely substituted the word “public” for “consumers.”
Rather, by using the word “public” in Article 22, the drafters of TRIPS might have
wanted to interpret this word in a more general sense. 182 Even if this was not their
intention, the word “public” has a broader meaning and opens the door for a
more expansive interpretation of Article 22. Since government agencies like patent
offices are representatives of the public, misrepresentations to a patent office may
177
178
179
180

181
182

TRIPS, supra note 23, at art. 22.
Id.
See generally Zappalaglio, supra note 151; Conrad, supra note 156.
TRIPS, supra note 23, at art. 22. See also Aaron C. Lang, On the Need to Expand Article 23 of the TRIPS
Agreement, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 487 (2006).
See TRIPS, supra note 23, at art. 23.
Id. at art. 22.
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be tantamount to deception of the public. Therefore, there is a forceful contention
that the scope of Article 22 is not limited to the mislabeling of products to
consumers.
Along the same lines, Article 22 never explicitly states that omissions are not
tantamount to deception or that it only prevents affirmative acts of fraud. Instead,
it frames the prohibition of deception in broad terms. 183 As detailed in the
previous section, omissions can constitute deception and for biological resources
that are “essentially attributable” to a foreign nation, failure to mention their
origins would likely lead the patent office or other readers of patent applications
to assume that the resources originated domestically. 184 Thus, there are sound
grounds for the assertion that Article 22 applies not only to package labels for
products but also to information on patent applications.
In practice, the WTO’s treatment of Article 22 of TRIPS seems inconsistent.
On one hand, in a PowerPoint presentation by the WTO entitled Geographical
Indications Ongoing Negotiations/Discussions in the WTO (Beijing Presentation), 185 the
WTO seems to implicitly connect the word “public” in Article 22 to consumers,
though it did not limit the application of the Article solely to goods sold on a
market. 186 If this is the correct interpretation of “public,” then Article 22 may be
unhelpful for arguing for disclosure on patent applications. In that case, one may
be able to argue that Article 22 mandates origin-of-resource disclosures in other
ways, such as ensuring that the invention or good is labeled with the correct
geographical indications in the marketplace. Because consumers would see
information regarding geographical origins on products’ packaging, such
disclosure through geographical indications may still give adequate notice to those
who want to challenge the patentability of these goods.
On the other hand, in a document to the TRIPS Council
(IP/C/W/247/Rev.1), various countries state that, although Article 22 is
applicable in the consumer context, the definition of what constitutes misleading
the public is not fixed; nations have the discretion to dictate the tests for
misleading. 187 If this statement is true, then it leaves room for an expansive
183

Id.

184
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Geographical Indications Ongoing Negotiations/Discussions in the WTO, WIPO-SAIC International
Symposium on Geographical Indications, Beijing, 26-28 June 2007, https://perma.cc/DQ47AT9P [hereinafter Beijing Presentation].
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available at https://perma.cc/P4GD-DALZ (last visited May 1, 2017).
See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Proposal from Bulgaria,
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definition of the word “public” to include representatives of the public and for
the interpretation of “misleading” statements to include omissions. Furthermore,
like the Beijing Presentation, IP/C/W/247/Rev.1 did not expressly exclude the
applicability of Article 22 to patent applications, which also leaves room for
arguments that information on patent applications falls under the scope of Article
22 and that Article 22 requires origin-of-resource disclosures.

VI. T HE I MPLEMENTATION OF A N ATIONAL S YSTEM OF
C HECKPOINTS U SING TRIPS AND THE N AGOYA
P ROTOCOL AS AN E NFORCEMENT M ECHANISM
This Comment has identified two potential instances where one could argue
for mandatory origin-of-resource disclosures under TRIPS: (1) when “the source”
of the material is “unique,” 188 and (2) when a “quality, reputation or other
characteristic” of the biological resources that contributed to the development of
an invention is “essentially attributable” to a geographic region. 189 Having these
requirements is the first step in ensuring that countries providing biological
resources receive benefits and recognition from inventions that utilize such
materials.
Nevertheless, many countries have asserted that TRIPS does not go far
enough. They contend the WTO should amend TRIPS to require disclosures on
patent applications whenever biological resources are used. 190 Some countries
have enacted domestic legislation, requiring more disclosure than mandated in
TRIPS. India, South Africa, and the Andean Community have taken initiative to
mandate that all inventors must reveal the source of any biological materials to
patent offices before they could obtain patents on their inventions. 191 One
commentator has proposed that the U.S. should require an origin-of-source
disclosure “whenever the invention being patented resulted from research on a
biological source, or the invention was in any way furthered by such research.” 192
Currently, a committee within the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) has been investigating the proper way to disclose biological resources on
patent application. 193 In 2013, the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual
188
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189
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(2011).
Intergovernmental Committee (IGC), World Intellectual Property Organization,
https://perma.cc/HK28-849M (last visited May 1, 2017).
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Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC)
created a draft document for a new treaty. 194 Some of the provisions of the treaty
require the disclosure of the geographical origins of genetic materials whenever
such resources are used in an invention. 195
In late 2016, parties to the IGC and TRIPS submitted a counterproposal that
is void of any disclosure requirements. 196 According to the new proposal, patent
examiners should just examine an invention on the basis of novelty and
inventiveness to determine patentability. 197 A database of genetic resources could
help patent offices with the evaluation. 198 The WIPO has neither ratified the draft
treaty nor the counterproposal. 199
Thus, there seems to be two sides to the discussion on disclosure: (1) there
should be a broad requirement for patent applicants to reveal the geographical
origins of biological resources whenever such resources are used in their
inventions; and (2) there should be no mandatory disclosure requirements because
protection of an invention should be limited to novelty and inventiveness. 200
These interpretations may not be ideal in solving the problem of AWBS. For
one, limiting the protection of biological resources to “novelty” and
“inventiveness” without requiring disclosure may not be helpful in preventing
instances of AWBS. The absence of obligatory origin-of-resource disclosure may
make it difficult for patent examiners to determine whether an invention is novel
or merely a repackaging of something that is already known. On the other hand,
even though mandating that patent applicants disclose the geographical origins of
all foreign genetic materials may prevent many instances of AWBS, a sweeping
disclosure requirement may become very costly in the rule’s enforcement.
194
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The mandatory disclosure provisions of TRIPS that were analyzed in the
previous Section may be sufficient to resolve many instances of AWBS that result
from nondisclosure. 201 What may be necessary to complement TRIPS is a system
to enforce these disclosure requirements without incurring huge costs.
The Nagoya Protocol is helpful for this task. Many countries with strong IP
systems such as Japan and members of the E.U. have signed and ratified the
Nagoya Protocol, which mandates a checkpoints system to ensure that “fair and
equitable benefit-sharing agreement[s]” are enacted between users and providers
of biological resources. 202 A national checkpoints system enforcing the minimum
standards of TRIPS and the Nagoya Protocol might likely be effective in
combating AWBS. Assuming that the WTO has not found that Article 22 applies
solely to labels on product packaging, this Section of the Comment shows that a
nation that is party to both TRIPS and the Nagoya Protocol can establish such a
system by requiring that its patent offices serve as checkpoints for the likely
mandatory disclosures under TRIPS and for identifying whether a benefit-sharing
agreement has been made.

A. Key provisions of the Nagoya Protocol
The goals of the Nagoya Protocol are to ensure that users of biological
resources obtain consent from providers and that fair and equitable benefitsharing agreements occur between these two parties. 203 Recognizing that nations
have sovereignty over their biological resources, 204 the Nagoya Protocol requires
benefit-sharing between the user and the provider of biological materials (which
is also the country of origin for these resources) through the negotiation of
mutually-agreed-upon terms. 205 The shared benefits must be “fair and
equitable.” 206 An example of such a benefit is joint ownership of IP rights between
a user and provider of a biological resource for an invention based on that
resource. 207
To guarantee that benefits-sharing agreements are enacted, the Nagoya
Protocol mandates that the country supplying the biological resources and the
user of these resources designate national “checkpoints” 208: these checkpoints
201
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202
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“monitor . . . the utilization” of a state’s resources to determine whether the goals
of the Protocol are met. 209 To guarantee that those who want to take biological
resources from their geographical origins comply with the provisions of the
Protocol, checkpoints would be empowered to receive information about the
sources of genetic resources, prior informed consent, and mutually-agreed-upon
terms. 210 By designating checkpoints within its jurisdiction, nations that are parties
to the Nagoya Protocol have the discretion to require users of biological resources
to disclose geographical origins of these materials.
Though the Nagoya Protocol does not explicitly name the types of public
institutions that could serve as checkpoints, 211 commentators have taken the
initiative to list possible examples of checkpoints that are allowed under the
Protocol. One commentator has identified that examples of such checkpoints
include “[r]esearch institutions subject to public funding, entities, publishing
research results relating to the utilisation of biological resources, intellectual
property examination offices, and authorities providing regulatory or marking
approval of products derived from biological resources” can all serve to fulfill
duties of a checkpoint. 212 In fact, many commentators have agreed that parties can
designate patent offices to serve as checkpoints. 213 Thus, it seems that the Nagoya
Protocol implicitly permits the user party and the country providing the biological
resources to agree to establish patent offices as checkpoints to guarantee that fair
and equitable benefits sharing occurs.

B. A Proposal: Patent Offices as Checkpoints for Enforcement
of the Mandatory TRIPS Disclosures
A country that only adheres to the disclosure-of-origins rules mandated in
TRIPS could likely implement an effective checkpoints system based on the
Nagoya Protocol. For one, a nation that is a party to both TRIPS and the Protocol
can enact legislation, declaring its patent offices to be checkpoints and requiring
that anyone who wants to patent an invention in that country consent to these
checkpoints. This action seems to be permissible under the Nagoya Protocol.
Article 15 expressly dictates that each State Party to the Protocol “shall take
appropriate, effective and proportionate legislative, administrative or policy
measures to provide that genetic resources utilized within its jurisdiction have
209
210
211
212
213

Nagoya Protocol, supra note 27, at art. 17(1).
See id. at art. 17(1)(a)(i).
See generally id. at art. 17.
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been accessed in accordance with prior informed consent and that mutually agreed
terms have been established.” 214 Because the Nagoya Protocol implicitly allows
patent offices to serve as checkpoints, a national mandate designating patent
offices as checkpoints would be an example of a legislative policy measure for
ensuring that benefits-sharing occurs.
At the same time, a checkpoints system under the Nagoya Protocol must
work in harmony with the minimum standards of TRIPS. The Nagoya Protocol
“recogniz[es] that international instruments related to access and benefit-sharing
should be mutually supportive with a view to achieving the objectives of the
Convention.” 215 Article 4 of the Protocol states that the treaty “shall be
implemented in a mutually supportive manner with other international
instruments relevant to this Protocol.” 216 Thus, the disclosure requirements must
be interpreted in compliance with TRIPS.
Accordingly, in a country that only implements the origin-of-resource
disclosures stated in TRIPS, Article 4 of the Nagoya Protocol suggests that if the
two conditions for disclosure are absent, then a patent applicant is not obligated
to reveal any specific information pertaining to “prior informed consent” and
“mutually agreed terms” on his or her patent application. 217 After all, if such
information is required to be disclosed to the patent office, it would likely reveal
the identity of the nation that is the geographical source of the biological material.
This action would contravene Article 4 of the Nagoya Protocol, as well as the
principle of TRIPS, by leaving it to each country to enact standards of patentability
that go beyond TRIPS. The fact that the nation chooses to only adopt the
minimum standards of TRIPS means that it does not want broader origin-ofresource disclosures.
How would a country that is a party to both the Nagoya Protocol and TRIPS
implement a national system of using patent offices as checkpoints while adhering
solely to the mandatory disclosure requirements of TRIPS? To be compliant with
the two treaties, a country could set the following rules for patent offices to serve
as effective checkpoints for disclosure and benefits-sharing:
First, the patent office would filter applications for patents based on
biological materials from other applications.
Second, the patent office would check the identity of the biological resources
or materials that are revealed within the application to determine whether they fit
within the two categories that likely trigger the mandate for disclosure. For
214
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215
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instance, patent offices could consult experts to find if the biological materials that
constitute the basis for the patent are unique to a specific location or have qualities
or reputation that are inherently tied to the location for which they are found. The
patent offices may also be able to consult databases on these materials. 218
Third, if the patent office determines that one of the conditions for
mandatory disclosure are met, the patent office would be required to check if the
applicant has disclosed the geographical origin of his or her resource. If he or she
failed to disclose, then the patent office must deny the application. It can then
inform the applicant of the grounds for denial and offer an opportunity for the
applicant to revise the application accordingly.
Fourth, pursuant to the power given by the Protocol, the patent office must
check whether the applicant has disclosed the fact that he or she obtained prior
informed consent from the national or local government of the country where the
resource is found. 219 The patent office would also need to check whether the
applicant has disclosed any “mutually agreed terms” of a “fair and equitable
benefit-sharing agreement” between the applicant and the government of the
nation where the resource is located. 220 Because the Nagoya Protocol does not
expressly define what constitutes “fair and equitable,” 221 the patent office as a
checkpoint may be within its discretion to devise its own standard. If there is an
absence of any of these features within the patent application, the patent office
must deny the application. It can then inform the applicant of the grounds for
denial and offer an opportunity for the applicant to revise the application
accordingly.

C. Policy Concerns Regarding Enforcement
Currently, many patent offices may be against enforcing origin-of-resource
disclosures. 222 For instance, in some South American countries, where sweeping
disclosure rules for biological resources exist, patent examiners “oppose––or lack
the capacity to perform––processing and reviewing more requirements than those
they already evaluate as part of regular patent procedures. 223 Enforcement may
cause delays in the patent application process due to the fact that biotechnological
218
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products use many different building blocks that may have different geographical
origins. 224 In the view of one commentator, an enforcement mechanism should
not impose “unnecessary burdens” on patent offices, and there must be
“limitations of disclosure of origins.” 225
The proposed checkpoints system in this Section addresses these concerns.
By enforcing only the minimum standards of TRIPS, the proposed system limits
the scope of origin-of-resource disclosures. Although investigations into the
origins of the biological resources may delay the patent application process, it is
unclear whether such delays would be significant because patent examiners will be
limited in their inquiry. Additionally, patent offices in countries with strong IP
systems that attract inventors may not have the problem of being incapable of
performing investigations. Even if such a problem exists, the added obligations of
patent offices under international and domestic law may justify petitioning their
legislature for more funding and manpower.
By setting the proposed rules for the patent office as a checkpoint, a country
that is a party to both TRIPS and the Nagoya Protocol would be able to facilitate
both the mandatory disclosure requirements of TRIPS and the goals of the
Nagoya Protocol. The effectiveness of this proposed checkpoints system is
explored in the following section.

VII. T HE E FFECTIVENESS OF U SING P ATENT O FFICES AS
N ATIONAL C HECKPOINTS TO E NSURE D ISC LOSURE AND
TO F ACILITATE B ENEFIT -S HARING
Nondisclosure may be a cause of AWBS, but the proposed checkpoints
system detailed in the previous section could be effective in preventing AWBS.
To show how a proposed checkpoints system would function as an enforcement
mechanism, this Comment analyzes the neem tree controversy and two possible
instances of AWBS concerning camu camu and Ballia barley. Each of these
situations involved inventors who failed to reveal the origins of the biological
resources on their patent applications; however, relevant secondary literature
suggests that they might have taken such resources from foreign territories.
Assuming that the secondary literature is true, had TRIPS and the Nagoya

224
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Protocol been in effect, and had the countries involved been parties to both
treaties, the proposed checkpoints system could have mandated disclosure. 226

A. The Neem Tree Controversy
The neem tree is native to India and is inherently connected to the cultural
heritage of the country. 227 Neem extracts have many practical uses and the people
of India have taken advantage of the many curative properties of the plant. For
example, “[o]rdinary Indians use neem tree bark to clean their teeth. Neem-leaf
juice is used to prevent psoriasis and other skin disorders and to control parasitic
infections. Neem extract is applied as an antidote to malaria.” 228
Extracts from the neem tree can also be used as pesticides. For Indian
farmers, the traditional way of killing insects is to use neem tree extracts. 229
Researchers studying different uses of neem trees have corroborated that the
people of India have traditionally utilized the neem tree for pesticide purposes. 230
After “[t]he West was alerted to the tree's wonders in 1959,” 231 the U.S.
Company W.R. Grace became interested in its pesticide qualities. Importing neem
tree seeds from India, 232 Grace soon isolated azadirachtin as the active insectfighting chemical within the neem tree. 233 In 1990, Grace filed application No.
5,124,349 in the USPTO to obtain a patent for a stabilized solution of
azadirachtin. 234 The application failed to mention that its seeds originated from
India. 235 The USPTO granted the patent in 1992. 236 Grace did not share the
proceeds of its patent with the Indian government. 237 In 1995, a nonprofit

226
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organization backed by the support of Indian farmers mounted a challenge to
Grace’s patent. 238
The neem tree incident is an example of AWBS. Had the TRIPS and the
Nagoya Protocol been in effect at this time and the U.S. and India been parties to
the treaties, the disclosure mandate and the checkpoints system would have
prevented Grace from obtaining a patent from the USPTO without
acknowledging on its application that it used seeds from India. Additionally, those
who wanted to challenge the patent would have done so much earlier in time
because they would have prompt notice of the geographical origins of the neem
tree.
For instance, when Grace applied for its patent for azadirachtin, Article 22
of TRIPS could have required disclosure. There may be a strong argument that
the reputation of the neem tree as a pesticide is “essentially attributable” to
India. 239 Azadirachtin is found within the neem tree. India has a long tradition of
using the neem tree as a means to kill insects and Indian farmers have traditional
ways of mixing and storing neem extracts for pesticide usage. 240 Although neem
trees can be grown elsewhere, using neem extracts as a pesticide seems to be a
custom limited to the Indian sub-continent. 241 Thus, unlike neem trees in India,
neem trees in other countries might not enjoy a reputation for being effective
pesticides. As a checkpoint, the USPTO would have done research to determine
whether this fact was true. It could have found that Article 22 was applicable here.
Accordingly, the USPTO could have enforced the disclosure requirement of
TRIPS by giving Grace a choice––either Grace reveal the neem seeds’
geographical origin or the USPTO would deny its application. If Grace chose to
continue with the application process, the revelation of the seeds’ geographical
origin would have given timely notice to the international coalition that wanted to
challenge Grace’s patent.
If the origin-of-resource disclosure is triggered, then under the proposed
framework, the USPTO would have checked whether Grace had enacted a “fair
and equitable benefit-sharing agreement” with India for the use of the neem tree
seeds. Since no benefit-sharing agreement existed, the USPTO would have not
approved the chemical patent. If Grace were to continue to pursue the application
process, the USPTO would have mandated that Grace negotiate an agreement
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with the Indian government and disclose the details of the agreement on its
application.
Therefore, had such a national system of checkpoints been enacted under
the guidelines of TRIPS and the Nagoya Protocol, and had the U.S. been a party
to these treaties, the USPTO could have prevented an instance of AWBS. Given
that a “fair and equitable benefit-sharing agreement” would have been enacted
between India and Grace (if they continued to pursue the patent approval
process), the economic harms to Indian farmers might have also been avoided.

B. Possible AWBS Involving Camu Camu
Camu camu (Myrciara dubia) is an Amazonian fruit that has an unusually high
concentration of vitamin C and a high level of antioxidant activity. 242 It grows in
Peru, Brazil, and other Western Amazonian countries. 243 Some researchers have
asserted that camu camu originated in Peru. 244 In fact, Peru contains the largest
population of camu camu as well as the largest genetic varieties of the fruit. 245
Evidence suggests that camu camu is much enjoyed in Peru 246 and that it has a
reputation for being an ingredient in Peruvian jam and juice. 247 Peru also cultivates
camu camu as a cash crop for export. In fact, “camu camu has become a flagship
species of the regional government of Ucayali, Peru where more than 1,300
families are involved in its cultivation.” 248
Since the mid-1990s, companies in Japan became interested in camu camu’s
high vitamin C content and they began patenting many products based on this
fruit. 249 In January 2000, the Japanese cosmetics company Kose Corporation
patented a skin lotion in the Japan Patent Office (JPO), and camu camu was an
ingredient in the lotion. 250 Kose’s patent application for the skin lotion
242
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JP2001031558A did not reveal the geographical origin of the camu camu.
However, because Japan was importing the fruit from Peru around this time, 251
there is a high likelihood that Kose’s camu camu originated from Peru. 252 In 2005,
Peru announced to the WTO that it had been investigating this patent application
for possible violations of patentability, but its preliminary analysis did not find a
specific violation. 253 Still, due to the adverse action that Peru had taken toward the
patent, it is unlikely that Kose had enacted a benefit-sharing agreement with the
Peruvian government for the skin lotion.
Both Japan and Peru had been signatories to TRIPS since 1995. 254 Let us
suppose that the Nagoya Protocol had also been in force during this time and that
Peru and Japan were parties to this treaty. Had the JPO been a checkpoint under
the Nagoya Protocol implementing the disclosure requirements of TRIPS, it
would have likely mandated Kose to reveal the origin of the camu camu that it
used for its lotion. This disclosure would have given earlier notice to those in Peru
who wanted to challenge the patent; an immediate challenge could have
uncovered information about the skin lotion and its patentability that Peru’s later
investigation did not. Additionally, the checkpoints system under the Nagoya
Protocol might have led to a benefit-sharing agreement between Kose and the
Peruvian government.
For one, the JPO could have enforced the disclosure provisions of Article
29 against Kose. This provision might have required Kose to reveal the
geographical origin of the camu camu if the type of camu camu in the skin lotion
is a one-of-a-kind genetic variant that is found in Peru. Given that Peru contains
the largest genetic varieties of the fruit, it is possible that the type of camu camu
used by Kose may be unique to Peru.
Similarly, Article 22 of TRIPS might have mandated disclosure. The people
of Peru grow camu camu as a cash crop. 255 One could argue that the way that the
Peruvian people grow the crop might have contributed to the distinctively high
concentration of Vitamin C in the plant and that the quality and reputation of
camu camu as having high Vitamin C concentration might be “essentially
attributable” to Peru. 256 As there may be a lack of research comparing the
concentration of Vitamin C or the level of antioxidant activity in Peruvian
cultivated camu camu with the qualities of camu camu grown in other Amazonian
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countries, the JPO as checkpoint would have commissioned a study on whether
the camu camu used by Kose had a quality or reputation distinctive to Peru. If
JPO had found that there was a “quality or reputation” of camu camu “attributable
to” Peru, then it would have required Kose to indicate on its application that Peru
was the geographical origin of the fruit. 257 This information would allow the
Peruvian government to investigate the claims within the application and to
potentially challenge the patent at an earlier time. Failure to disclose would have
led to a denial of Kose’s application.
Furthermore, as a checkpoint, the JPO would have likely confirmed whether
Kose had a “fair and equitable benefit-sharing agreement” with Peru for the use
of camu camu. 258 Since Article 29 or Article 22 might have likely compelled Kose
to disclose the geographical origin of the camu camu, the JPO would have
required Kose to reveal the existence of a benefit-sharing agreement. Because it is
likely that Kose did not enact any benefit-sharing agreements with the Peruvian
government at the time, JPO would have likely denied Kose’s patent application.
Kose would have needed to negotiate an agreement with the Peruvian government
in order to proceed with the application process.

C. Possible AWBS Involving Ballia Barley
Ballia barley is a type of barley grown in “the city of Ballia in India’s northern
state of Uttar Pradesh.” 259 What makes Ballia barley distinctive is that it contains
a defective lipoxygenase gene (LOX-less) that does not code for the protein
lipoxygenase. 260 “Barley lipoxygenase (LOX-1) is an enzyme that naturally occurs
in most barley grain, but for brewers, it causes headaches. Lox-1 is one of the
reasons why beer develops a stale taste and weaker head (less foam) when stored
for long periods.” 261 Because LOX-1 is not present in Ballia barley, beer made
from this type of barley can be stored longer without losing flavor. 262 The city of
Ballia is also part of “an area of traditional barley cultivation” in India and “part
of the crop’s secondary centre of diversity in the Himalayan region.” 263
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In the early twentieth century, a storage program was developed to protect
Indian barley. 264 “The program ‘was confined to the development of improved varieties by
selection from the indigenous material.’ In other words, it used local seeds from local
farmers, and not barleys from elsewhere. The products of this program included
high quality malting barleys, the type used in brewing.” 265 Ballia barley seeds were
selected for storage in the mid-Twentieth century. 266 One researcher Edward
Hammond of the Third World Network, which is a nonprofit international
organization, believed that these seeds made their way to Japan’s Okayama
University where they were stored and then used by Sapporo Brewers, Ltd, a
brewing company in Japan. 267
Hammond suggested that Sapporo began to experiment with Ballia barley
and other Lox-less barley around the early 2000s. 268 In 2013, Sapporo filed a patent
application in the USPTO, claiming an invention of the Lox-less plant, Lox-less
malt, and a method of production of making the Lox-less malt by cross-fertilizing
Japanese barley Taishomugi with a Lox-less barley SBOU2. 269 In its USPTO
application, Sapporo neither disclosed the geographical origin of SBOU2 nor
identified the name of SBOU2. 270 However, Hammond speculated that SBOU2
corresponded to the Ballia barley. 271 This claim might have been made stronger
by the fact that in a recent news article, Sapporo acknowledged that the Lox-less
barley used in its experiments originated from India and that Okayama University
had stored the barley in a gene bank. 272 In March 19, 2015, Sapporo refiled another
USPTO application with the serial number US 2015/0257354 A1, covering the
same invention and containing the same information as its 2013 application. 273
Sapporo pursued the same patent in the European Patent Office (EPO),
filing its application on March 25, 2004. 274 The EPO granted the patent on
October 22, 2008. 275 In this application, Sapporo also did not disclose the
geographical origin of the SBOU2 used in its patent. 276
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There is no evidence that Sapporo or Okayama University had negotiated a
benefit-sharing agreement with the Indian government in regards to Sapporo’s
patent. 277 Given that Hammond is claiming biopiracy in this instance, it is unlikely
that a benefit-sharing arrangement has been made. 278
For the purpose of demonstrating how the proposed checkpoints system
would operate as an enforcement mechanism, this Comment assumes that
SBOU2 in Sapporo’s patent application refers to Ballia barley, and that for its
invention, Sapporo used seeds that originated from the Ballia region of India. 279
Both U.S. and the E.U. have been parties to TRIPS since it entered into force in
1995. 280 Had the Nagoya Protocol also been in force during this time and had U.S.
and the E.U. been parties to the Nagoya Protocol, there is a possibility that the
USTPO and EPO, as checkpoints, would have enforced the disclosure
requirements and the benefit-sharing requirement against Sapporo.
First, the USPTO and EPO could have found that Article 29 of TRIPS was
applicable. For example, the fact that the researchers only cross-fertilized Ballia
barley with the Japanese Taishomugi barely to make its malt may suggest that
other types of Lox-less barley might not be compatible with cross-fertilization or
that they were not as viable as the Ballia barley. As a result, Ballia barley might be
a unique variant of Lox-less barley and under Article 29, such uniqueness may
trigger the origin-of-resource disclosure.
The USPTO and EPO could have also found that Article 22 of TRIPS was
applicable. The fact that Ballia barley is Lox-less and/or the fact that Ballia barley
is capable of being cross-fertilized with Taishomugi might be due to the
environment of the Ballia region of India or to the farming methods that the Ballia
residents cultivated the grain. As checkpoints, the EPO and the USPTO would
have conducted investigations to verify these facts. If these checkpoints had found
that there was a “quality or reputation” of Ballia barley “essentially attributable to”
the Ballia region, they would have required Sapporo to indicate on its application
that India was the geographical origin of the grain. 281 Information about the
geographical origin would have also allowed the government of India or
international watchdog organizations like the Third World Network to promptly
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investigate and challenge the claims within Sapporo’s applications as soon as they
are made public.
Moreover, if the conditions for disclosure had been present, the EPO and
USPTO would have investigated Sapporo to find whether the company had
negotiated a “fair and equitable benefit-sharing agreement” with the government
of India. 282 As Article 29 or Article 22 might have likely mandated disclosure, the
EPO and the UPSTO would have required Sapporo to reveal the existence of a
benefit-sharing agreement with India on its patent application. Since Sapporo
likely had not enacted any benefit-sharing agreements with the Peruvian
government at the time, the patent offices would have likely denied Sapporo’s
applications. If Sapporo wanted to continue to pursue the application process with
either the EPO or USPTO, it would have agreed to share the benefits of its patent
with India.

VIII. C ONCLUSION
In regards to access of biological resources, AWBS is an important issue for
the international community to address. While producing some positive effects, 283
AWBS also results in significant negative externalities. 284 One of the reasons that
AWBS has persisted is that in many cases, patent applicants fail to disclose the
geographical origins of the biological resources that form the basis for their
inventions. As such, requiring that patent applicants disclose the geographical
sources of their biological materials is the first step for the international
community to combat AWBS.
Under TRIPS, one can likely argue that international law mandates originof-resource disclosures on patent applications in two circumstance: (1) when “the
source of the biological resource [is] unique” 285 and (2) when “a quality,
characteristic, or reputation of the biological resources that contributed to the
development of an invention is essentially attributed” to a geographic region. 286
Regarding enforcement of these mandates, a country that is a party to both
TRIPS and the Nagoya Protocol could prevent AWBS by using patent offices as
checkpoints. As checkpoints under the Nagoya Protocol, patent offices could
operate to prevent many future cases of AWBS by enforcing the disclosure
requirements of TRIPS and the benefit-sharing requirement of the Nagoya
Protocol.
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It may be in the self-interest of countries with strong IP systems to have
their patent offices enforce the minimum origin-of-resource requirements of
TRIPS even if those countries are not parties to the Nagoya Protocol. As we have
seen in neem incident, residents of nations providing biological resources can have
strong emotional attachment to their countries’ natural resources. 287 Instances of
AWBS may lead to international ill will, decrease provider countries’ willingness
to deal with foreign entities, and prevent potential scientific innovation. Enforcing
the disclosure mandates under TRIPS, patent offices may not only be able to avert
many cases of AWBS but also foster international good will.
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